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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 970697-CA 
v. : 
SERVANDO PARRA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for three counts of aggravated assault, all third 
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1996), one count of 
carrying a concealed dangerous weapon used in the commission of a crime of violence, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-504(3) and 76-10-
501(2) (1996), and one count of criminal mischief, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1996)). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Since probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the warrantless 
search of the car involved in this drive-by shooting, did the trial court properly 
deny defendant's motion to suppress the revolver found under his seat? 
When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews 
the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law for 
correctness. State v. McGrath. 928 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Since the pretrial showup identification of defendant was reliable, did the 
trial court properly deny defendant's motion to suppress it? 
In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit a pretrial showup identification, 
an appellate court"defer[s] to the trial court's fact-finding role by viewing the facts in 
the lights most favorable to the trial court's decision to admit and by reversing its 
factual findings only if they are against the clear weight of the evidence. . . . On the 
other hand, whether these facts are sufficient to demonstrate reliability is a question of 
law, which [an appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 
774, 782 (Utah 1991); accord State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 657 (Utah App. 1992). 
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3. Since the evidence would not support conviction for a lesser offense, did 
the trial court properly refuse to give defendant's proposed lesser included offense 
instructions? 
A trial court's refusal to give a lesser included offense instruction presents a 
question of law which this Court reviews for correctness, giving no particular deference 
to the trial court. State v. Ouada. 918 P.2d 883, (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1986): 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or 
may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence 
of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been 
committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense, and diere is reasonable cause for believing 
the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1995): 
Assault. 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes 
substantial bodily injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused 
serious bodily injury to another. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995): 
Aggravated Assault. 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as 
defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation 
of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601 or other means, or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection 1(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection 2(b) is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1996): 
Carrying concealed dangerous weapon — Penalties. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-103 and in Subsections (2) 
and (3): 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous 
weapon, as defined in Section 76-10-501, which is not a 
firearm on his person or one that is readily accessible for 
immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in 
this part, in a place other than his residence, property, or 
business under his control [and] . . . 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a crime of 
violence as defined in Section 76-10-501 [including assault with a 
dangerous weapon, or, aggravated assault, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
103], and the person is a party to the offense, the person is guilty of a 
second degree felony. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1996): 
Carrying loaded firearm in vehicle . . . . 
(1) Unless otherwise authorized by law, a person may not carry a 
loaded firearm: 
(a) in or on a vehicle . . . 
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-506 (1996): 
Threatening with or using dangerous weapon in fight or 
quarrel. 
Every person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-
503, who, not in necessary self defense in the presence of two or more 
persons, draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry and 
threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same in any fight of quarrel is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with three counts of aggravated assault, all 
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103, with firearm and in 
concert enhancements (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203 and 76-3-203.1 (1996)), one count 
of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon used in the commission of a crime of 
violence, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-504(3) and 
76-10-501(2) (1996), and one count of criminal mischief, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106, with a firearm enhancement (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-203 (1996)) (R. 15-20, 35-38). The State later amended the three aggravated 
assault counts to third degree felonies (R. 57-58). 
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the revolver seized from the 
car he was driving at the time of the alleged offenses (R. 39-41). He also filed a 
motion to suppress the pretrial identification by one of the victims during a showup at 
the scene of his arrest (R. 42-44). The State responded to these motions in writing (R. 
67-99), and defendant filed a written reply to the State's response (R. 101-110). After 
6 
a hearing (R. 254-396), the trial court, ruling from the bench, denied the motions (R. 
396-403, addendum A; cf R. 114-117).l 
Defendant was convicted by a jury (R. 217-221; 249-250) and sentenced to one-
to-fifteen years in prison on the second degree felony concealed weapon count, zero-to-
five years on each of the three third degree felony aggravated assault counts and the 
criminal mischief count, all to be served concurrently, with credit for time served (R. 
229-232, 250). The trial court also sentenced defendant to a fine totaling $30,000, and 
to restitution in the amount of $1,500 to be paid jointly and severally with his three 
codefendants. IdL Defendant timely appealed (R. 233-235; see Utah R. App. P. 4(c)). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Defendant was the driver of a car involved in a freeway drive-by shooting. 
The incident began at approximately 2:30 a.m. on 19 January 1997, at a 
convenience store parking lot in Salt Lake City when his codefendants began staring at 
the occupants of the victims' car. After the victims' car left the convenience store, 
defendant and his codefendants followed it in two cars onto northbound 1-15. On the 
1
 The trial court made oral, but not written, findings. 
2
 These facts are taken from the evidence at the suppression hearing (see R. 254-
406). An appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences "in the light 
most favorable to the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion." Sandv City v. 
Ihorsness, 778 P.2d 1011, 1012 (Utah App. 1989). 
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freeway near Farmington, the two cars pulled up at high speed along either side of the 
victim's car. Defendant's passengers hung out the windows, flashed gang signals at the 
three occupants, and yelled, "What's up?" Ultimately, one of his codefendants fired 
several shots from a .357 magnum revolverv At least one bullet struck the left rear 
passenger door of the victim's car, and another blew out its left rear tire (R. 91-92, 
258-259, 289-290, 343-350, 352, 363. 365-366, 383). 
As defendant sped off, the victims pulled over to the side of the road where a 
police officer was making a traffic stop. After the victims provided information, the 
police officer reported the drive-by shooting, and gave the victims' description of the 
two suspect cars and their occupants to a police dispatcher. Because he did not see 
either suspect car pass by, the officer requested that police units in both directions be 
on the lookout, then finished issuing a citation to the driver he had stopped, and began 
to more thoroughly question the victims (R. 91-92, 96, 277). 
It was a quiet night, and there was hardly any traffic on the interstate (R. 285). 
After hearing the dispatch report, another officer parked at a northbound entrance and 
began to watch for passing traffic. While he waited, he heard another officer report 
that she had just seen one of the suspect vehicles traveling southbound on the freeway. 
Shortly thereafter, the waiting officer spotted a car headed southbound that was similar 
to the description given by the victims: it appeared to be an older Buick Regal, with a 
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Hispanic driver and others inside.3 It was the first vehicle that had passed his location. 
The officer turned his marked police car around, entered the southbound freeway, and 
began to pursue the car without activating his overhead emergency lights (R. 258-262, 
264, 269-270, 273-274, 278-280, 284-285, 288, 311). 
Flight. With the police car following, defendant immediately accelerated and 
reached an estimated speed of 85 miles per hour, swerving several times between lanes 
without signaling, and otherwise driving erratically while his back-seat passengers kept 
turning and looking at the officer through the rear window. Defendant signaled once as 
though he were going to exit the freeway, and then swerved off the exit back onto the 
freeway. Later he signaled that he was going to change lanes into the passing lane, but 
abruptly swerved into the exit lane and off the freeway. As the police car continued to 
follow, defendant drove through a red light and then a stop sign. Finally, he pulled the 
car part of the way into a driveway to a house and stopped (R. 96-97, 262-265, 268, 
281,323,383). 
3
 The policeman who took the description said the victims had indicated it was "a 
possible tan or gray" (R. 91). The original dispatch described the car as a "tan Buick 
Regal," but the car the officer observed and followed was a blue Chevrolet Monte 
Carlo (R. 91, 96, 269-270, 283, 353). However, a Regal and Monte Carlo closely 
resemble each other, and the car appeared to be lighter than the blue it turned out to be 
(R. 270, 284-286). The victim who later identified the car denied describing it as "tan" 
to the police (R. 353). 
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The officer pulled in about thirty feet behind the car, parking on the street, and 
activated his overhead emergency lights for the first time. Because he was without any 
backup and was facing several suspects in a drive-by shooting who had obviously tried 
to elude him, the officer got out of his car with his gun drawn and began to execute a 
felony stop (R. 97, 265-268, 273-274, 279-281, 312). 
Defendant got out of the car and began to go toward the house until ordered 
several times by the officer to stop and put his hands above his head. A passenger also 
got out of the car, and, although the officer ordered him several times to stop, ran into 
the house (R. 97, 265-266, 290-291, 297, 317). 
Ammunition in Plain View. Finally, other police officers arrived, ordered the 
remaining passengers from the car, handcuffed them, and looked into the car from the 
outside. In plain view on the middle console between the front seats, the officers saw 
what appeared to be a radio scanner, a 9 millimeter round, and several .357 rounds (R. 
97, 266-267, 284, 296-297, 300, 304-305, 308-309, 314-316).4 
Ammunition from Patdown of Defendant. When officers conducted a patdown 
search of defendant, they found eight .357 rounds in his pants pockets (R. 97, 291-294, 
305-308). 
4
 "The officers noticed in plain view in the vehicle certain 357 [sic] cartridges 
that were in the console and a scanner" (R. 400). Despite this uncontradicted and 
unchallenged evidence, defendant now asserts, "Nothing significant in plain view was 
observed in the vehicles [sic]" (Def. Br. at 18). 
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Eventually, the passenger who fled into the house responded to officers' orders, 
came out, and surrendered (R. 97, 312-313, 317-320). Each of the suspects was placed 
in a separate patrol car (R. 268, 301-302, 310). After the owner of the house 
consented, a search disclosed a 25 millimeter pistol and a loaded clip on a shelf in the 
basement that had been accessible to the fleeing passenger (R. 315, 317-320).5 
Victim's Showup Identification of the Car. Defendant, and Codefendants. 
Before long another police officer brought one of the victims to the scene. He 
positively identified the blue Monte Carlo as the one from which the shots were fired.6 
Officers then removed defendant and the codefendants from their patrol cars and stood 
them next to each other illuminated by a spotlight so that the victim could see them. 
He positively identified defendant as the driver and the codefendants as the passengers 
(R. 97, 282-283, 300-302, 330, 332-342, 350-352, 354-363).7 
Seizure and Removal of the Car. Because they were investigating a drive-by 
shooting, had four suspects in custody none of whom was the car's registered owner, 
were in a well-known high-crime area, and because it was the middle of a cold January 
night, officers transported the seized car back to the Farmington City Shops in Davis 
5
 It is unclear from the record who owned this gun. 
6
 See n.2, above. 
7
 At another location, the victim later identified the other car involved in the 
incident, and its two occupants were also taken into custody (R. 98, 331, 335). 
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County (since the shooting occurred in that jurisdiction) so that they could hold it for 
the registered owner and process it for evidence in a more secure, well-lit, and 
controlled setting (R. 95, 321-329, 370-372, 383-387). 
Search of Car: Revolver. During the subsequent search, an officer found a 
"Ruger" model GT-100 .357 magnum revolver under the driver's seat (R. 93, 98, 367-
381). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Since probable cause and exigent circumstances justified the removal 
and warrantless search of the car involved in this drive-by shooting, the trial court 
properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the revolver found under his seat. 
Defendant does not dispute that there was probable cause for his arrest, nor 
challenge the patdown incident to his arrest that disclosed ammunition. Likewise, 
defendant does not challenge a victim's identification of the car he was driving as the 
one from which shots were fired. Finally, defendant does not challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact in support of probable cause for the search as clearly erroneous. 
Therefore, defendant's conclusory assertion that there was no probable cause for a 
search of the car fails to meet his briefing burden and should be ignored. In any event, 
the trial court correctly concluded that there was probable cause to search the car. 
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Exigent circumstances also existed because the car likely contained a firearm, 
the car itself was movable, its occupants and others known to them were alerted, and, 
as a result, the car's contents might never have been found again if a warrant had to be 
obtained. Since exigent circumstances existed at the scene, the trial court properly 
concluded that police could remove the car to the jurisdiction where the shooting 
occurred to conduct the search. 
Point II. Since the pretrial "showup" identification of defendant by a victim was 
reliable, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress it. The trial 
court correctly concluded that the victim had an adequate opportunity, degree of 
attention, and capacity to observe defendant during the shooting, the victim identified 
defendant spontaneously after the shooting and was consistent in identifying him at the 
suppression hearing, and the shooting was the kind of incident a victim would 
remember and relate correctly where, as here, the identification of defendant took place 
within hours. In any event, since the State's case against defendant did not rest on his 
pretrial identification by this victim, any error admitting it was harmless. 
Point III. Since it was undisputed that the revolver was fired, there was no 
rational basis for a verdict acquitting defendant of aggravated assault or carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon involved in a crime of violence and convicting him 
instead of simple assault, brandishing or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
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quarrel, and simply carrying a loaded weapon in a vehicle. Therefore, the trial court 
correctly refused to give defendant's proposed lesser included offense instructions. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE CAR FROM 
WHICH THE SHOTS WERE FIRED IN THIS DRIVE-BY 
SHOOTING 
Defendant does not dispute that there was probable cause for his arrest in 
connection with the drive-by shooting, nor challenge the patdown incident to his arrest 
that disclosed .357 rounds in his pants pockets. Likewise, defendant does not challenge 
a victim's identification of the car he was driving as the one from which shots were 
fired. Instead, defendant argues that neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances 
justified the removal and search of the seized car he had just been driving, and that the 
.357 revolver found under his seat should therefore have been suppressed (Def. Br. at 
19-23). 
Defendant appears to focus his argument on exigent circumstances (see Def. Br. 
at 15-23). However, in his "Summary of Argument," defendant asserts, "No exigent 
circumstances or probable cause existed to private property and [sic] that the Court 
erred in finding exigent circumstances to justify the seizure and the subsequent search" 
(Def. Br. at 15; emphasis added). Likewise, in the concluding paragraph of his 
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"Argument" section, defendant merely asserts, "Here there was no probable cause or 
plain view of any gun and the defendants had all been taken to jail" (Def Br. at 23; 
emphasis added). 
Aside from these summary and conclusory assertions, nowhere in his brief does 
defendant explain, with citations to the record or case authority, why there was no 
probable cause nor why the trial court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. Indeed, 
defendant's central factual assertions are themselves either incomplete or in error (see, 
e.g.. Def. Br. at 8-12, 18; n.4 above). Defendant has therefore failed in his briefing 
burden, and this Court should decline to consider his probable cause claim. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9), 24(e) and 24(i); State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145 (Utah App. 
1997) (a "reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump 
the burden of argument and research" (citations omitted); Burns v. Summerhavs. 927 
P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("'This court has routinely declined to consider 
arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal.'" (quoting State v. Yates. 834 
P.2d 599, 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1992))); Walker v. U.S. Gen.. Inc.. 916 P.2d 903, 907 
(Utah 1996) (refusing to address argument containing no citations to record or cases); 
CitvofOremv. Henrie. 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) ("We refuse to provide the 
independent analysis defendant has failed to submit"); Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 
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69, 72-73 (Utah App. 1991) (assuming correctness of judgment below where 
appellant's brief contained no citations to record, no legal authorities, no analysis). 
In any event, the trial court properly concluded that the search of the car was 
justified by both probable cause and exigent circumstances. 
A. Analysis: Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances 
Under either the federal or state constitution, the rule is the same: a warrantless 
search of an automobile requires "a showing of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances." State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah 1996) (citing 
California v. Acevedo. I l l S.Ct. 1982, 1985-1986 (1991) and State v. Larocco. 794 
P.2d 460, 469-470 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion)). 
1. Probable Cause. The trial court's conclusion that there was probable cause 
to search here is amply supported by its oral factual findings which defendant has not 
challenged: 
In the matter before the court there is no question that the officers 
involved had been informed that there had been a drive-by shooting which 
occurred in Davis County. That the suspected vehicle was identified as a 
Pontiac, as I recall [the trial court later amends this to "Buick," R. 403], 
and tan in color, a larger General Motors vehicle. That it was occupied 
by four or five males of Hispanic origin. That the vehicle was thought to 
be northbound and then possibly southbound in Davis County. 
Shortly after that attempt to locate was issued, Officer Hooper saw 
the vehicle or a similar vehicle southbound on 1-15 in the area of Woods 
Cros [sic], 2600 South. That he immediately pulled in behind the vehicle. 
Observed the occupants in the vehicle. Noted that the passenger in the 
back seat kept turning and looking at him and the vehicle sped at speeds 
up to 80 or 90-95 miles per hour and during that process executed various 
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erratic attempts at leaving the freeway; the most notable being that which 
occurred at the area of the 900 West offramp in Salt Lake City at which 
time the vehicle signals as if it were going to stay on the freeway and go 
left and then immediately veered to the right and took the 900 West exit. 
The officer, rather than stop the vehicle because of lack of backup, 
continued to follow the vehicle to about 600 West in that area or 600 
North wherein the vehicle turned into a driveway. He immediately turned 
in behind the vehicle. Activated his overhead lights. The person in the 
passenger seat of the vehicle ran into the home despite his request that he 
not do so. Mr. Servando Parra [defendant], who was die driver, tried to 
exit the vehicle but was asked by the officer to remain and he did. . . . 
The court would find that the officers were aware that this was the vehicle 
that had been identified. That the victims were brought by and Mr. 
Tokelau Lealiki was brought by the vehicle and shortly after the incident 
occurred and with his own initiative picked out the vehicle, although it 
was different in color than that initially broadcast as being the vehicle that 
was involved. The officers noticed in plain view in the vehicle certain 
357 [sic] cartridges that were in the console and a scanner. 
(R. 398-399, 400; addendum A).8 
In concluding that the police had probable cause to search the car, the court 
found "that not only the contents of the vehicle but the vehicle itself constituted 
evidence and that they had the right to seize that evidence at that time and that's what 
they did" (R. 400). See Chambers v. Maronev. 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, n.6 (1970) 
("Here as will be true in many cases, the circumstances justifying the arrest are also 
those furnishing probable cause for the search"; State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 
1237 (Utah 1996) ("before stopping Anderson, the police had probable cause to arrest 
8
 The trial court also concluded that there was probable cause to arrest all the 
vehicle occupants (R. 399-400). As noted, defendant does not dispute this. 
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him for possession of a controlled substance. By implication, the officers had probable 
cause to believe that the vehicle in which Anderson was found contained controlled 
substances"); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1996).9 
In sum, given defendant's attempts to elude a police car on the freeway shortly 
after the shooting, including swerving between lanes, signaling to go one direction and 
then going the other, signaling left and then swerving right to exit the freeway, and 
running a red light and a stop sign (especially when the officer had not activated his 
overhead emergency lights); given the rear seat passengers' constant turning around to 
look back at the pursuing officer; given the passenger running into a house from the 
stopped car, and defendant's attempts to go into the house after the officer did activate 
his overhead lights, drew his gun, and ordered them several times to stop; given the 
ammunition in plain view on the center console of the car; given the fact that no 
weapon was found on any of the suspects; and given a victim's positive identification of 
the car and its occupants, the trial court correctly concluded that police had probable 
cause to seize the car and search it for evidence related to the drive-by shooting. 
9
 See n. 11, below. 
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2. Exigent circumstances. It is well settled that exigent circumstances exist 
when "the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never 
be found again if a warrant must be obtained," and "when the safety of police officers 
is threatened." Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237 (citations omitted). It is also the rule that 
"exigent circumstances are to be weighed only at the time the vehicle is seized by 
police." Id, at 1237-1238 (citing Texas v. White, 96 S. Ct. 304, 305 (1975) and 
Chambers v. Maronev, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981-1982 (1970)). 
The trial court properly found that there were exigent circumstances here. 
Although he did not separately list the factors supporting his decision (see R. 401), the 
uncontradicted record amply supports his ruling. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 
787 (Utah 1991) ("[when] factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by the 
trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we 'assume that the trier of [the] 
facts found them in accord with its decision, and we affirm the decision if from the 
evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it'") (quoting Mower v. 
McCarthy. 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1952)) (additional citations omitted); 
State v. Van Matre. 777 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) (defendant did not object to the lack of 
findings at trial; therefore, he is not entitled to assert the lack of specific and/or written 
findings as a ground for error on appeal). Indeed, many of the facts the judge recited 
supporting probable cause also support exigent circumstances (see R. 398-400, quoted 
under A. 1., above). 
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Listed below are exigent circumstances justifying die warrantless search in 
defendant's case: 
• During a patdown search, officers found several .357 rounds in 
defendant's pants pockets (R. 97, 291-294, 305-308). Officers also 
saw several .357 rounds in plain view on the center console of the 
car, as well as what appeared to be a 9 millimeter round (R. 97, 
266-267, 284, 296-297, 300, 304-305, 308-309, 314-316). But no 
firearm was found on any of the suspects (R. 308, 315, 319-320). 
• There were persons, apparently known to the defendants, in the 
house, and the passenger who fled there had an opportunity to 
contact them and others to come to the scene (R. 315, 317-320). 
• The keys were still in the car (R. 323), and none of the suspects, 
and no one in the house, was its registered owner (R. 95, 322, 
326, 328, 383-387). 
In sum, it was likely the car contained a handgun that could be a threat to the 
safety of the officers and others, the car itself was movable, the occupants and others 
known to them were alerted, and, as a result, the car's contents (including ammunition, 
and, possibly, the gun used in the shooting) might never have been found again if a 
warrant had to be obtained. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1237. Exigent circumstances 
justified the search of the car.l0 
10
 Defendant cites Coolidge v. New Hampshire. 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2028-2029, 
2035-2037 (1971) in support of his argument that there were no exigent circumstances 
(see Def. Br. at 20-21). However, Coolidge can be readily distinguished. Since police 
in that case had been conducting an investigation for several weeks, they had no exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless search. 
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United States and Utah Supreme Court cases, directly support the trial court's 
conclusion that the seizure, removal, and search of the car were reasonable in this case. 
In Chambers v. Maroney. 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970), the United States 
Supreme Court held that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile 
where it was stopped late at night could constitutionally search it later at the station 
house without first obtaining a warrant. Chambers. 90 S.Ct. at 1981. 
The facts in Chambers are very similar to the facts here. Witnesses described a 
vehicle speeding from the scene of a robbery with four men inside. Within an hour, a 
vehicle answering the description was stopped by police. The occupants were arrested 
and the car was driven to the police station. In the course of the search there, police 
found two revolvers and later found matching ammunition in Chamber's possession. 
Chambers, 90 S.Ct. at 1977. The Supreme Court reasoned that 
[i]t was not unreasonable to take the car to the station house. All 
occupants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of 
the night. A careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not 
safe for the officers, and it would serve the owner's convenience and the 
safety of his car to have the vehicle and the keys together at the station 
house. 
IdL, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, n.10. The Supreme Court concluded: 
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one 
hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue 
to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search 
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without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
Chambers. 90 S.Ct. at 1981. 
Citing Chambers, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229 
Utah 1996), upheld a search of a car at a secure impound lot the day after Anderson 
was arrested. The supreme court held that as long as police had probable cause to 
search, and exigent circumstances existed at the time the car was stopped and seized, 
the warrantless search conducted sometime later at a secure location did not offend the 
Fourth Amendment. Anderson. 910 P.2d at 1237-1238. Quoting Chambers, the court 
also concluded that "[t]he probable-cause factor" that developed on the scene "still 
obtained at the station house." Id at 1238 (quoting Chambers. 90 S.Ct. at 1981). 
In this case, the trial court quoted Anderson and concluded that probable cause 
and exigent circumstances justified the removal and search (R. 401). The trial court 
was correct, and therefore properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.11 
11
 The search here could also be justified on alternative grounds (see State v. 
Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah App. 1991)): as a search incident to defendant's 
lawful arrest. See New York v. Belton. 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863, 2864 (1981) ("when a 
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, 
as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile"); Texas v. White. 96 S.Ct. 304, 305 (1975) (probable cause for arrest and 
search of car at the scene provided probable cause for search of car at the station 
house); State v. Giron. 943 P.2d 1114, 1117-1121 (Utah App. 1997) (search incident to 
arrest is "contemporaneous" to arrest of occupant and satisfies requirement of temporal 
proximity, if routine, continuous sequence of events occurs during same period of time 
as arrest); State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986) (Continued...) 
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Point II 
SINCE THE PRETRIAL SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION OF 
DEFENDANT WAS RELIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IT 
Defendant argues that the pretrial identification procedure used here was a 
lineup, and that he therefore had a right to have an attorney present (Def. Br. at 25-26). 
Defendant also argues that his pretrial identification by one of the victims was 
unreliable, and that his motion to suppress it should have been granted (Def. Br. at 23-
26). 
On the contrary, because the procedure here was a showup and not a lineup, 
defendant had no right to have counsel present. Likewise, the trial court properly 
evaluated the evidence and correctly concluded that the pretrial identification was 
reliable. In any event, any alleged error was harmless since the State's case against 
defendant did not rest on his pretrial identification by the victim. 
(Continued...) (search of narcotics suspect was not invalid, despite fact it preceded 
formal arrest, where as arrest and search were substantially contemporaneous and 
probable cause to effect arrest existed independent of evidence seized in search); but 
see Chambers v. Maronev. 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1979 (1970), and Preston v. United States, 
84 S.Ct. 881, 883 (1964) (note: both of these cases were decided before Bel ton). 
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A. Lineup v. Showup 
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to have counsel present at pretrial 
identification procedures conducted 'at or after the initiation of adversary judicial 
criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment.'" State v. Mincv. 838 P.2d 648, 655 (Utah 
App. 1992) (quoting Kirbv v. Illinois, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1883 (1972) (other citations 
omitted)). Because the identification procedure here occurred after his arrest but before 
he had been charged with any crime, defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to have 
counsel present. Mincy. 838 P.2d at 655. 
However, Utah law provides that " [a] suspect has the right to have his attorney 
present at any lineup." Utah Code Ann. § 77-8-2 (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, 
there is a statutory right to counsel whenever a lineup is conducted. But this right 
applies only to a lineup: a suspect has no right to the presence of counsel at a showup. 
Mincy. 838 P.2d at 655; State v. Poteet. 692 P.2d 760, 763 (Utah 1984).12 
12
 A lineup usually takes place at a police station a substantial time after the 
crime has been committed and typically includes several individuals similar in 
appearance to the suspect. Lineups are generally conducted to test an eyewitness's 
ability to identify the suspect from a random group chosen because of their physical 
similarity to the suspect. Mincy. 838 P.2d at 655. In contrast, a showup usually takes 
place at the scene of the crime or arrest soon after the crime has been committed. A 
showup is conducted so that a victim or witness can immediately identify whether a 
person in custody was actually the perpetrator. IdL 
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In this case, police were in the investigatory stage, still trying to confirm the 
identities and roles of the suspects involved in the drive-by shooting. No one had yet 
been charged, and the only persons viewed were defendant and his codefendants. 
Therefore, the procedure was a showup, and defendant had no statutory right to have 
counsel present. Mincy. 838 P.2d at 655-656. 
B. Constitutional "Reliability" Analysis 
Under State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), evaluating the admissibility 
of a pretrial identification requires the consideration of five factors: 
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; 
(2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; 
(3) the witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was 
made spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was 
the product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed 
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. 
Id, at 781 (quoting State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483, 493 (Utah 1986). 
Defendant not only fails to challenge the trial court's oral findings of fact under 
the "five reliability factors" (see R. 401-403), but completely ignores them. He has 
therefore failed to establish that, viewed "in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
decision and giving due deference to the trial judge's ability to appraise demeanor 
evidence," his findings of fact are "against the clear weight of the evidence." Ramirez. 
817P.2dat784, 782. 
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A proper review of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the 
pretrial identification was reliable. Because the state constitutional analysis is "as 
stringent as, if not more stringent than, the federal analysis," there is "no need to 
perform a separate Biggers13 federal analysis" here. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 784. 
Following is a summary of the trial court's factual findings, with supporting citations 
from the record: 
• Opportunity of witness to view the actor during the event. The victim 
observed the defendant driving and the other suspects yelling and hanging 
out windows of a car traveling alongside three to four feet away for 10-15 
seconds (R. 402; see R. 345-350). 
• Witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event. With 
the suspects pulled alongside, shouting and gesturing, the victim's 
attention was naturally drawn to them (R. 402; see R. 345-350). The 
victim did not get a good look at the driver's face, but clearly saw that he 
was wearing a western "duster" coat (R. 402; see R. 347, 351, 357-360). 
• Witness's capacity to observe the event, including his physical and mental 
acuity. The victim was a passenger, not the driver of the car in which he 
was traveling (R. 346). There is no evidence that he had any disability on 
the night of the incident that would have affected his ability to observe. 
• Witness's level of certainty, spontaneity, and consistency. The victim's 
identification of the car and of the suspects, including defendant, was 
immediate, certain, spontaneous,14 and consistent (R. 403; see R. 97, 282-
13
 Neil v. Biggers. 93 S.Ct. 375, 381-382 (1972). 
14
 There is no evidence that police prompted the victim before or during the 
identification procedure to suggest answers or the result they sought. When they drove 
up to the scene, an officer asked the victim if any of the cars parked there was involved 
in the shooting. The victim immediately pointed to the suspect car and identified it. 
The four suspects were then asked to get out of their separate (Continued...) 
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283, 300-302, 330-342, 350-352, 354-363; see also B.I., above). During 
the suppression hearing, with codefendants present, the victim again 
identified defendant as the driver (R. 358-360). 
• Nature of the event observed and likelihood the witness would perceive, 
remember, and relate it correctly. Being a victim of a drive-by shooting 
is an unusual, memorable event. The victim had observed defendant and 
the other suspects as they drove alongside and shouted for 10-15 seconds 
(R. 403; see R. 345-350), and he identified the defendant within a few 
hours of the shooting (R. 403; see R. 97, 282-283, 300-302, 330-342, 
350-352, 354-363). 
In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that the victim's pretrial identification 
of defendant was reliable. 
C. Harmless Error 
In any event, even if, arguendo, the trial court incorrectly ruled that defendant's 
pretrial identification by the victim was admissible, any error was harmless. There was 
no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for defendant even if it had not been 
admitted. See Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 788 (citing State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919 
(Utah 1987)). 
Defendant has not challenged his pretrial identification by the police officer who 
followed the car and made the felony stop (R. 96-98, 265-268, 273-274, 279-281, 312), 
(Continued...) patrol cars and line up. All of them were in handcuffs. Without 
hesitation, or prompting of any kind, the victim identified defendant as the driver of the 
car and the codefendants as the passengers (R. 97, 282-283, 300-302, 330, 332-342, 
350-352, 354-363). 
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nor his pretrial admission to an officer that he was, in fact, the driver (R. 482). 
Further, defendant stipulated to the crime lab results that the slug recovered from the 
side of the victims' car had been fired from the revolver that was found under his seat 
(R. 520-524; see R. 443-444). His only witness testified that he fired the revolver at 
the victims' car (R. 526). Defendant tried to elude a marked police car even though the 
officer following him had not activated his overhead emergency lights (R. 96-97, 258-
265, 268, 273-274, 278-281, 284-285, 288, 311, 323, 383). After finally stopping the 
car, defendant jumped out and begin to go toward a house even after the officer, with 
gun drawn, ordered him several times to stop (R. 97, 265-268, 273-274, 279-281, 290-
291, 297, 312, 317). During a patdown search, which he does not challenge, 
ammunition for the revolver used in the shooting was found in defendant's pants 
pockets (R. 97, 291-294, 305-308). 
In sum, the State's case against defendant did not rest on the victim's pretrial 
identification. 
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Point HI 
SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS UNDISPUTED THAT THE 
REVOLVER WAS FIRED, THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR 
A VERDICT ACQUITTING DEFENDANT OF AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT OR CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS 
WEAPON INVOLVED IN A CRIME OF VIOLENCE AND 
CONVICTING HIM INSTEAD OF LESSER OFFENSES; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO 
GIVE DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Defendant moved the trial court for an instruction charging simple assault and 
threatening or using a firearm in a fight or quarrel as lesser included offenses of 
aggravated assault (R. 557-558; see R. 144, 149, 163, 165). Defendant also 
apparently15 moved for an instruction charging carrying a loaded firearm as a lesser 
included offense of carrying a concealed weapon used in the commission of a crime of 
violence (R. 559; see R. 145, 166-167). The trial court denied both motions (R. 558-
560; addendum B). 
Defendant now argues that the trial court improperly refused to give the lesser-
included offense instructions he requested (Def. Br. at 26-29). However, since 
defendant stipulated at trial to the crime lab results that a slug recovered from the 
victims' car had been fired from the revolver found under defendant's seat, there was 
no rational basis for a verdict acquitting defendant of aggravated assault or carrying a 
15
 Defendant's oral motion on this point is somewhat confusing (see R. 559; but 
see R. 166-167). 
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concealed dangerous weapon used in a crime of violence while convicting him of the 
lesser offenses. 
A. Two-Part Analysis: First. Are There Overlapping Elements? If So. Is there a 
Rational Basis for Acquitting of the Greater and Convicting of a Lesser Offense? 
This Court recently held that 
[bjefore an instruction on a lesser included offense can properly be 
given, the trial court must conduct a two-part analysis. First, the court 
should compare the statutory elements of the two crimes and determine 
whether there are any overlapping elements. State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 
152, 159 (Utah 1983) [see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3)(a) (1995)]. 
Next, it should evaluate the evidence to determine if there is a rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged while 
convicting him of the alternative offense. IdL [See also Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-402(4) (1995).] If both parts are satisfied, the trial court must 
provide the jury widi an instruction on the lesser included offense. Id. 
State v. Ouada. 918 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah App. 1996); see also State v. Velarde. 734 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1986). 
1. Aggravated Assault. Assault, and Brandishing 
a. Statutory Elements Test: Are There Overlapping Elements? The chart on 
the following page compares the statutory elements of aggravated assault, simple 
assault, and threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel (the 
elements are numbered for convenience; shared portions of elements are in italics, and 
unique portions are underlined): 
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Aggravated Assault 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 
(1996)} 
Assault 
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 
(1996)) | 
(la) An attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another. OR 
(lb) An act, committed with unlawful force of violence, that 
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodilv iniurv to another, OR 
l 
(lc) A threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence, to do bodily injury to another, OR 
(2a) AND Uses a dangerous 
weapon 
(2b) OR Other means, or force 
likely to produce death or 
serious bodily injury 
(2c) OR Intentionally causes 
serious bodily injury to another 
Threatening with or 
using dangerous weapon 
in fight or quarrel 
MUtah Code Ann. § 7tf-I0-50<f || (1996)) 1| 
(1) In the presence of two or 
more persons, AND 
(2) Not in necessary self-
defense, AND 
(3a) Drawing or exhibiting any 
dangerous weapon in an angry 
and threatening manner, OR 
i (3b) Unlawfully using any 
dangerous weapon . . . 
(3b) . . . In any fight or quarrel 
From the chart, it is clear that aggravated assault and simple assault not only 
have overlapping elements, but that simple assault is a "necessarily included" offense of 
aggravated assault. See State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Hill. 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983); State v. Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 1983). 
It is also clear that threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel (or, "brandishing") requires proof of additional facts that neither aggravated 
31 
assault nor simple assault require, namely, (1) that the crime be committed "in the 
presence of two or more persons," and (2) that the dangerous weapon be "draw[n] or 
exhibited]" in an "angry and threatening manner."16 See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
402(3)(a) (1995). Based on a comparison of the statutory elements, brandishing a 
dangerous weapon is not a lesser included offense of either aggravated assault or simple 
assault.17 
16
 Brandishing also has an alternative element not shared by the other two 
crimes, namely, that a dangerous weapon be used in a "fight or quarrel." 
17
 But see State v. Oldrovd. 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984). The Utah Supreme 
Court in Oldrovd, found that aggravated assault and brandishing had "elements in 
common. Both require a form of threat and both require the use of a weapon. Thus, 
the statutes do have overlapping elements, and the first segment of the Baker test has 
been met." Id at 554. However, Oldrovd is inapposite for two reasons. First, the 
assault statute in 1984 did not include as an alternative, "an act, committed with 
unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(l)(c) (1996) (emphasis added); cf Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-5-102(a) and (b) (1984). That specific subsection was the basis for the 
aggravated assault charges here (see R. 35-37, 190-192). Hence, while brandishing a 
dangerous weapon, without more, may arguably suffice to commit the other two forms 
of assault, it would not be sufficient or necessarily included in an "act. . . that causes 
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102(l)(c) (1996) (emphasis added); see McCovev. 803 P.2d at 1236. Second, a careful 
reading of Oldrovd discloses that the court did not actually analyze the statutory 
elements of the offenses, but instead compared only the alternative elements that were 
relevant to the charged offenses. See Oldrovd. 685 P.2d at 554. Such an 
"intermediate" analysis is not in harmony with the well-settled two-part Baker test that 
mandates a review of the "statutory elements," and then an evaluation of the evidence. 
See Quada, 918 P.2d at 885; Velarde, 734 P.2d at 449; Baker. 671 P.2d at 159; see 
also State v. Pavne. No. 971207-CA, slip op. at 7 (Utah App. August 6, 1998). 
(Continued...) 
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In sum, while simple assault may be a lesser included offense of aggravated 
assault, brandishing is not. 
b. Evaluating the Evidence: Is There a Rational Basis for Acquitting of 
Aggravated Assault and Convicting of Simple Assault? Even though there are 
overlapping elements between aggravated assault and simple assault, defendant's 
argument still fails. "[A]n instruction on a lesser included offense (even one that must 
necessarily have been proved by the evidence on the charged or greater offense) is 
inappropriate unless there is a basis in the evidence upon which the jury could acquit of 
the greater offense and convict of the lesser offense." State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 
532 (Utah 1983). An evaluation of the evidence discloses no rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting defendant of aggravated assault while convicting him of simple assault. 
Defendant stipulated to the crime lab report that the slug recovered from the side 
of the victims' car was fired from the revolver found under his seat (R. 520-524; see R. 
(Continued...) 
Even if this Court adopts the "charged elements" analysis in Oldroyd. 
defendant's argument still fails based on an evaluation of the evidence. Defendant's 
case is very similar to the facts in State v. Ouada. 918 P.2d 883 (Utah App. 1996). In 
that aggravated assault case, the defendant admitted firing a gun. He did not merely 
"draw or exhibit" it, and was not a party to "any fight or quarrel" nor acting "in 
necessary self defense." IcL at 886. This Court therefore upheld the trial court's 
refusal to instruct that the threatened use or use of a dangerous weapon in a fight or 
quarrel was a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Id. As in Ouada. such an 
instruction would have been inappropriate here, and the trial court was correct in 
denying defendant's request to give one. 
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443-444; see also R. 526). Likewise, the evidence is uncontradicted that defendant: 
drove up alongside the victims' car; was driving when his codefendant's hung out 
windows, flashed gang signals, and shouted at the victims; was present when his 
codefendant, seated on the front seat next to him, retrieved the revolver from under the 
seat, loaded it and fired, striking the victims' car and blowing out a tire; and that 
defendant had ammunition for the revolver in his pants pockets (R. 415-423, 427-428, 
432-433, 442, 465, 479-482, 493-494, 500-503, 506, 509-519, 520-539). 
In sum, because the evidence was undisputed that the revolver was fired (see 
element 2(a) under "Aggravated Assault" in the chart above), there is no rational basis 
for acquitting defendant of aggravated assault and convicting him instead of simple 
assault. Quada, 918 P.2d at 885 (citations omitted). 
34 
2. Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon and Carrying a Loaded Firearm 
a. Statutory Elements Test: Are There Overlapping Elements? The following 
chart compares the elements of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon with the 
elements of carrying a loaded firearm (the elements are numbered for convenience; 
shared portions of elements are in italics, and unique portions are underlined): 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Carrying a Loaded Firearm in a 
Weapon Vehicle* etc 
[ (Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 (1996)) \ {Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1996)) 
1. Defendant carried a concealed 1. Defendant carried a loaded firearm 
dangerous weapon 
a. IF a loaded firearm, then class B 
misdemeanor, OR 
a. In a vehicle, OR 
b. On any public street, OR 
c. In a posted prohibited area 
b. IF an unloaded firearm, then class A 
misdemeanor, OR 
c. IF a sawed-off shotgun (loaded or 
unloaded), then 3rd degree felony), OR 
d. IF a firearm used to commit a crime 
of violence (loaded or unloaded), then 
3rd degree felony 
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Even if defendant's motion preserved this "lesser included" issue,18 his argument 
still fails since the Utah Supreme Court has held, as a matter of law, that "'carrying a 
loaded firearm in a vehicle' is not a lesser included offense of 'carrying a 
concealed dangerous weapon.'" State v. Williams. 636 P.2d 1092, 1097 (Utah 1981). 
b. Evaluating the Evidence: Is There a Rational Basis for Acquitting of 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon Used to Commit a Crime of Violence and 
Convicting of Carrying a Loaded Firearm in a Vehicle? Even if there were 
overlapping elements, defendant's argument still fails. Because the evidence was 
undisputed that the slug recovered from the side of the victims' car was fired from the 
revolver found under defendant's seat, there is no rational basis for acquitting defendant 
of carrying a concealed dangerous weapon used to commit a crime of violence and 
convicting him instead of simply carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle. Ouada. 918 
P.2d at 885 (citations omitted); see element 1(d) under "Carrying a Concealed 
Dangerous Weapon" in the chart above. Likewise, there is, in fact, no evidence that 
the revolver was loaded except in the moments just before it was fired (see R. 526-
538). 
See n.15, above. 
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In summary, since the evidence is undisputed that the revolver was fired, there is 
no rational basis for acquitting defendant of aggravated assault and carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon involved in a crime of violence and convicting him instead of simple 
assault, threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel, and 
simply carrying a loaded weapon in a vehicle. Therefore, the trial court correctly 
refused to give defendant's proposed lesser included offense instructions. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions and sentences should be affirmed. 
The State does not request oral argument or a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / ^ day of August, 1998. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
BARNARD N. MADSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Trial Court's Rulings on Search and Showup (R. 396-403) 
ITS BURDEN. 
AND FINALLY WITH REGARD TO THE PRETRIAL 
IDENTIFICATION. I THINK THE TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM HAS BEEN 
MOST PROBITIVE TODAY. HE STATED THAT HIS RECOLLECTION IS NOT 
BASED ON THE FACT THEY ARE WEARING YELLOW JUMPSUITS FROM THE 
JAIL, BUT BASED ON THE ENCOUNTER THAT HE HAD WITH THEM. HIS 
IDENTIFICATION WAS PROVIDED WITHOUT HESITATION. HE WAS FIRM 
AND COMFORTABLE ON THE WITNESS STAND AND BASED ON HIS ABILITY 
TO OBSERVE AS HE TESTIFIED AND THE CLOSENESS IN PROXIMITY OF 
THEM THAT HE WAS TAKEN DOWN TO THE SCENE FOR THAT 
IDENTIFICATION, THEN I WOULD SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT HIS 
IDENTIFICATION IS RELIABLE. 
AND THAT GOES TO ONE ASPECT OF THE IDENTIFICATION 
BECAUSE WE HAVE TO MEET TWO BURDENS. WE HAVE TO SHOW NOT ONLY 
THAT IT WAS NOT UNDULY SUGGESTIVE BUT ALSO THAT IT WAS 
RELIABLE IN AND OF ITSELF. 
WITH REGARD TO THE SUGGESTIVENESS, THIS IS THE VERY 
TYPE OF SHOWUP THAT THE CASE LAW TALKS ABOUT. AND 
SPECIFICALLY --
THE COURT: I THINK THAT'S SUFFICIENT, MR. DIREDA. 
MR. DIREDA: STATE VERSUS MINZ, YOUR HONOR, I WOULD 
DIRECT THE COURT'S ATTENTION TO THE CASE BECAUSE THAT CASE 
CLEARLY SETS OUT THE STANDARD. 
THE COURT: THE COURT WILL RULE AS FOLLOWS IN THIS 
MATTER. FIRST OF ALL, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK COUNSEL FOR THE 
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ASSISTANCE THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN THE COURT IN THE CASES ARE 
APPLICABLE. IT'S BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND I'VE REVIEWED IT AND 
DONE SOME RESEARCH OF MY OWN. 
FIRST OF ALL, ON THE STANDING ISSUE. THE TWO ISSUES 
THAT ARE RELEVANT IS THAT FIRST THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND 
THE SECOND IS THE CLAIM OF EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IS 
REASONABLE IN VIEW OF SOCIETY'S AS A WHOLE. THOSE ARE THE TWO 
QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ANSWERED. IN OF ALL THESE CASES AND 
CASE LAW, BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL, IT IS CLEAR AS STATED IN THE 
STATE VERSUS DAILO, I BELIEVE IT IS. A DEFENDANT WHO'S 
SEARCHED WITH NEITHER A PROPRIETARY NOR POSSESSORY INTEREST IN 
AN AUTOMOBILE NOR INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY SEIZED HAS NO 
LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY AND NO STANDING. AND 
APPLYING THAT TO THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT, IT IS CLEAR THAT 
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MR. SERVANDO PARRA NONE OF THESE 
DEFENDANTS MEET THAT STANDING REQUIREMENT. AND THEREFORE THEY 
ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO CHALLENGE THE QUESTION OF THE 
SUFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY OF THE SEARCH AND THE FRUITS WHICH 
CAME FROM THAT. 
THE COURT THEN TURNS TO THE BENEFIT OF MR. PARRA, TO 
SERVANDO PARRA, THE QUESTION OF PROPRIETY OF THE SEARCH AND 
THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT. AN INVENTORY SEARCH IS 
REASONABLE IN ORDER PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY IN POLICE 
CUSTODY, TO PROTECT POLICE AGAINST THE CLAIM OF LOSS OR THEFT 
AND TO DETECT DANGEROUS CONDITIONS OF INSTRUMENTALITIES WITHIN 
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THE IMPOUNDED VEHICLE; IN OTHER WORDS, TO PROTECT THE POLICE 
FROM DANGER. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THIS CASE IS NOT AN 
APPROPRIATE IMPOUND CASE. THE VEHICLE WAS ON PRIVATE 
PROPERTY. THERE WAS NO REASON TO IMPOUND THE VEHICLE UNDER 
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXISTED ON THAT EVENING. FURTHER 
EVIDENCE OF THAT IS THE FACT THAT THIS WAS NOT HANDLED AS A 
REGULAR IMPOUND WOULD HAVE BEEN. IT WAS NOT TAKEN TO AN 
IMPOUND LOT. IN FACT, IT WAS TAKEN TO A LOCATION WHERE IT 
COULD BE SEARCHED. AND THAT'S THE REASON IT WAS IMPOUNDED. 
IT WAS NOT TO SEE ANY OF THOSE PREREQUISITES OF AN INVENTORY 
IMPOUND. 
THE COURT, HOWEVER, TURNS TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER 
OR NOT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO CONDUCT A SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE OF THIS PARTICULAR VEHICLE. IN THE MATTER BEFORE THE 
COURT THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE OFFICERS INVOLVED HAD BEEN 
INFORMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A DRIVE-BY SHOOTING WHICH 
OCCURRED IN DAVIS COUNTY. THAT THE SUSPECTED VEHICLE WAS 
IDENTIFIED AS A PONTIAC, AS I RECALL, AND TAN IN COLOR, A 
LARGER GENERAL MOTORS VEHICLE. THAT IT WAS OCCUPIED BY FOUR 
OR FIVE MALES OF HISPANIC ORIGIN. THAT THE VEHICLE WAS 
THOUGHT TO BE NORTHBOUND AND THEN POSSIBLY SOUTHBOUND IN DAVIS 
COUNTY. 
SHORTLY AFTER THAT ATTEMPT TO LOCATE WAS ISSUED, 
OFFICER HOOPER SAW THE VEHICLE OR A SIMILAR VEHICLE SOUTHBOUND 
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ON 1-15 IN THE AREA OF WOODS CROS, 2600 SOUTH. THAT HE 
IMMEDIATELY PULLED IN BEHIND THE VEHICLE. OBSERVED THE 
OCCUPANTS IN THE VEHICLE. NOTED THAT THE PASSENGER IN THE 
BACK SEAT KEPT TURNING AND LOOKING AT HIM AND THE VEHICLE SPED 
AT SPEEDS UP TO 80 OR 90-95 MILES PER HOUR AND DURING THAT 
PROCESS EXECUTED VARIOUS ERRATIC ATTEMPTS AT LEAVING THE 
FREEWAY; THE MOST NOTABLE BEING THAT WHICH OCCURRED AT THE 
AREA OF THE 900 WEST OFFRAMP IN SALT LAKE CITY AT WHICH TIME 
THE VEHICLE SIGNALS AS IF IT WERE GOING TO STAY ON THE FREEWAY 
AND GO LEFT AND THEN IMMEDIATELY VEERED TO THE RIGHT AND TOOK 
THE 900 WEST EXIT. THE OFFICER, RATHER THAN STOP THE VEHICLE 
BECAUSE OF LACK OF BACKUP, CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THE VEHICLE TO 
ABOUT 600 WEST IN THAT AREA OR 600 NORTH AREA WHEREIN THE 
VEHICLE TURNED INTO A DRIVEWAY. HE IMMEDIATELY TURNED IN 
BEHIND THE VEHICLE. ACTIVATED HIS OVERHEAD LIGHTS. THE 
PERSON IN THE PASSENGER SEAT OF THE VEHICLE RAN INTO THE HOME 
DESPITE HIS REQUEST THAT HE NOT DO SO. MR. SERVANDO PARRA, 
WHO WAS THE DRIVER, TRIED TO EXIT THE VEHICLE BUT WAS ASKED BY 
THE OFFICER TO REMAIN AND HE DID. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT BASED UPON THAT INFORMATION 
THE OFFICER IN QUESTION HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE 
CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT THESE DEFENDANTS HAD 
COMMITTED THAT CRIME AND THAT THE CRIME WAS A FELONY AND THERE 
WAS PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AT THAT TIME. THE COURT WOULD 
FIND THAT SHORTLY AFTER THAT BACKUP ARRIVED. EACH OF THE 
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OCCUPANTS OF THE VEHICLE WERE ASKED TO LEAVE THE VEHICLE OR 
SUMMARILY PATTED DOWN AND HANDCUFFED AND THEN WERE, PURSUANT 
TO THAT, PATTED DOWN IN A MORE EXTENSIVE MANNER AND INCIDENT 
TO THE ARREST THEREIN THE 357 CARTRIDGES WERE FOUND IN THE 
POCKET OF MR. PARRA. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE AS 
I'VE INDICATED TO ARREST ALL OF THE OCCUPANTS OF THAT VEHICLE, 
GIVEN THE INFORMATION KNOWN TO THE OFFICER. THE COURT WOULD 
FIND THAT THE OFFICERS WERE AWARE THAT THIS WAS THE VEHICLE 
THAT HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED. THAT THE VICTIMS WERE BROUGHT BY 
AND MR. TOKELAU LEALIKI WAS BROUGHT BY THE VEHICLE AND SHORTLY 
AFTER THE INCIDENT OCCURRED AND WITH HIS OWN INITIATIVE PICKED 
OUT THE VEHICLE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS DIFFERENT IN COLOR THAN THAT 
INITIALLY BROADCAST AS BEING THE VEHICLE THAT WAS INVOLVED. 
THE OFFICERS NOTICED IN PLAIN VIEW IN THE VEHICLE CERTAIN 357 
CARTRIDGES THAT WERE IN THE CONSOLE AND A SCANNER. AND THE 
COURT WOULD FIND THAT THEY HAD -- THAT THE POLICE HAD PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT NOT ONLY THE CONTENTS OF 
THE VEHICLE BUT THE VEHICLE ITSELF CONSTITUTED EVIDENCE AND 
THAT THEY HAD THE RIGHT TO SEIZE THAT EVIDENCE AT THAT TIME 
AND THAT'S WHAT THEY DID. THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THE 
VEHICLE WAS SEIZED AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TAKEN TO THE 
FARMINGTON CITY SHOPS WHERE A SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED. 
THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT THE CRITICAL QUESTION AS TO 
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SEARCHES OF THIS NATURE IS THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE ISSUE IS 
CRITICAL AT THE TIME THAT THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. IN THE MOST 
RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT BY THE SUPREME COURT WHICH IS STATE 
VERSUS ANDERSON WHICH WAS AUTHORED BY, AS I RECALL -- WELL, 
DOESN'T MATTER. BUT THEY STATE IN THAT OPINION THAT AS LONG 
AS THE POLICE HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH AND EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES EXIST AT THE TIME THE AUTOMOBILE WAS STOPPED AND 
SEIZED, A WARRANTLESS SEARCH CONDUCTED SOMETIME LATER AT A 
SECURE LOCATION WOULD NOT OFFEND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. AND 
THAT WAS JUSTICE RUSSON THAT ISSUED THAT OPINION. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THERE WERE EXIGENT 
CIRCUMSTANCES SIMILAR TO THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVELANT IN 
CHAMBERS AND THOSE CASES AND THAT THE SEARCH EXECUTED BY THE 
POLICE IN THIS CASE WAS IN FACT WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. AND THEREFORE THE COURT WILL 
DENY THE DEFENDANT'S SERVANDO PARRA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE 
WEAPON THAT WAS FOUND IN THE VEHICLE. 
THE COURT NEXT TURNS TO THE QUESTION OF SHOWUP AND 
THE IDENTIFICATION THAT WAS OBTAINED AT THAT PARTICULAR 
LOCATION. THE CRITICAL ISSUE IS DID THAT IDENTIFICATION AT 
THE POINT OF ARREST VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF EITHER 
THE STATE OR FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
IN LOOKING AT REALLY TWO ISSUES THERE. WAS THE SHOWUP 
SO SUGGESTIVE AS TO GIVE RISE TO PROBABILITY OF IRREPERABLE 
IDENTIFICATION. AND SECONDLY UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
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CIRCUMSTANCES WAS THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE RELIABLE. THE 
COURT WOULD FIND THAT ESSENTIALLY THE STANDARD IS THE SAME FOR 
BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. JUSTICE ZIMMERMAN, 
LOOKING AT THAT QUESTION, SEEMS TO BE THE ROMERAS CASE JUST 
ABOUT FOLLOWING VERBATIM THE DISTINCTION IN THE LONG CASE 
WHICH HAD TO DO WITH EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND THE 
QUESTION OF RELIABILITY. LOOKING AT THE OPPORTUNITY THE 
WITNESSES HAD TO VIEW THE ACTOR AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT. MR. 
LEALIKI TESTIFIED THEY WERE HANGING OUT OF THE WINDOW. THAT 
THE VEHICLES WERE IN THREE OR FOUR FEET OF EACH OTHER 
TRAVELLING UP THE FREEWAY AND THAT EXTENDED FOR SEVERAL 
SECONDS. THAT HE HAD A GOOD LOOK AT THE OCCUPANTS OF THE 
VEHICLE. HE INDICATED HE COULD NOT SEE THE DRIVER. BUT THAT 
HE CLEARLY SAW THE TYPE OF CLOTHING THAT HE WAS WEARING. AND 
FROM HIS TESTIMONY THE COURT ASSUMES HE WAS WEARING ONE OF THE 
DUSTER KIND OF WESTERN CLOTHING THAT SOME OF OUR YOUTH AND 
OTHERS SEEM TO WEAR FROM TIME TO TIME. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THE INCIDENT WAS ONE IN 
WHICH THE ATTENTION OF MR. LEALIKI WOULD HAVE BEEN DRAWN TO 
THE ACTOR. THIS WAS A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY WERE SHOUTING 
BACK AND FORTH AND BASICALLY THE LEALIKI VEHICLE WAS 
SURROUNDED BY TWO VEHICLES WITHIN A FEW FEET OF EACH OTHER 
TRAVELLING UP THE FREEWAY IN CLOSE PROXIMITY. THE COURT WOULD 
FIND THAT THE DESCRIPTION THAT WAS GIVEN OF THE OCCUPANTS WERE 
THAT OF HISPANIC MALES. I REALIZE THAT IS NOT DEFINITIVE BUT 
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THE VEHICLE WAS DESCRIBED AS A BUICK -- EXCUSE ME -- IT WAS A 
BUICK RATHER THAN A PONTIAC AS I PREVIOUSLY STATED. THAT AT 
LEAST THE A.T.L. SAID IT WAS TAN IN COLOR. MR. LEALIKI SAID 
IN FACT IT WAS BLUE IN COLOR AND IN FACT THE EVIDENCE WOULD 
SHOW IT WAS. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT MR. LEALIKI WAS CERTAIN IN 
HIS IDENTIFICATION OF THE WITNESSES AT THE TIME OF THE 
CONFRONTATION AND THAT HIS BEING TAKEN TO THE AREA AND VIEW 
THE DEFENDANT WAS WITHIN A FEW HOURS OF THE INCIDENT THE SAME 
NIGHT. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT THE SITUATION WHICH THE 
VICTIM SAW WHEN HE ARRIVED AT THE SCENE HE PICKED OUT THE 
VEHICLE WITHOUT ANY SUGGESTION. THE COURT WOULD FIND HE 
OBSERVED THE DEFENDANT WHO WAS IN HANDCUFFS IN THE LIGHTS OF A 
POLICE VEHICLE AND HE IDENTIFIED THEM AS BEING THE OCCUPANTS 
OF THE VEHICLE IN QUESTION. THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT UNDER 
THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT THE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS WAS 
RELIABLE. WAS NOT SO SUGGESTIVE AS TO GIVE RISE TO THE 
PROBABILITY OF IRREPARABLE IDENTIFICATION. THE COURT MAKES 
THAT DECISION IN LIGHT OF ONE OF THE CASES CITED BY COUNSEL OR 
ONE I READ MYSELF. I CAN'T REMEMBER. BUT IN THIS CASE THE 
DEFENDANT WAS HANDCUFFED TO A FENCE AND THE VICTIM WAS BROUGHT 
TO THE LOCATION AND THE DEFENDANT WAS SPOTLIGHTED, HANDCUFFED 
TO THE FENCE AND THE EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE AND 
THE COURT RULED THAT WAS NOT UNDULY SUGGESTIVE. 
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Addendum B 
Trial Court's Rulings on Lesser Include Offense Instructions (R. 558-560) 
COURT TO GRANT A LESSER INCLUDED INSTRUCTION ON AGGRAVATED 
ASSAULT. THERE'S A UTAH CASE THAT SAYS THAT IN CERTAIN 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT IT IS FOR THE COURT TO DETERMINE THAT THE 
THREATENING OR USING OF A FIREARM CAN BE A LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE AND ALSO I SUBMITTED AN INSTRUCTION SAYING THAT SIMPLE 
ASSAULT WOULD BE A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE. WE HAVE SUBMITTED 
AN INSTRUCTION ON WHAT WE BELIEVE OF A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
IN ASSAULT AND WE WOULD MOVE THE COURT TO GIVE THOSE 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
THE COURT: THE COURT WILL DENY THAT AND THE COURT 
DOES THAT, APPLYING A TWO-PRONG REVIEW OF EACH OF YOUR 
REQUESTS. FIRST OF ALL, LOOKING AT THE STATUTE ITSELF TO SEE 
IF THE ELEMENTS OF THE TWO CRIMES ARE SIMILAR AND WHETHER THEY 
ARE OVERLAPPING ELEMENTS. AND SECONDLY, IN SAYING WHETHER OR 
NOT THERE'S A RATIONAL BASIS FROM THE EVIDENCE FOR A VERDICT 
ACQUITTING THE DEFENDANT OF THE HIGHER CHARGE AND CONVICTING 
OF THE LESSER CHARGE. I SPECIFICALLY LOOKED AT YOUR PROPOSED 
INSTRUCTION ON BASICALLY BRANDISHING A WEAPON. I LOOKED AT 
THE CASE OF STATE VERSUS QUADA WHICH IS AT 291 UAR 26, WHICH 
IS AN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CHARGE IN WHICH A REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION FOR LESSER INCLUDED OF THREATENING WITH A FIREARM 
IS REQUESTED. AND THE JUDGE DENIED THAT AND WAS SUSTAINED BY 
THE APPELLATE COURT. THE REASONING WAS THAT IN THAT 
PARTICULAR CASE ACTUALLY SHOTS WERE FIRED AND THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE OF ANY THREATENING WITH A WEAPON. I THINK THAT'S THE 
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CASE HERE. AND SO I'LL FIND THERE'S NO EVIDENCE WHICH WOULD 
RATIONALLY PROVIDE A BASIS FOR A CONVICTION OF THAT PARTICULAR 
CHARGE. 
SECONDLY, AS TO THE SIMPLE ASSAULT, THERE'S NO 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A SIMPLE ASSAULT CHARGE IN THIS MATTER. 
IF IN FACT ASSAULT OCCURRED, IT WAS AN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
BECAUSE THE ASSAULT ITSELF WAS A RESULT OF THE USE OF A DEADLY 
WEAPON. THEREFORE, I'LL DENY YOUR REQUEST FOR A LESSER 
INCLUDED ON THAT PARTICULAR BASIS. AS THE QUESTION I THINK 
YOU ALSO ASKED LESSER INCLUDED ON THE CARRYING A CONCEALED 
WEAPON. 
MR. GAITHER: IF I COULD MAKE A MOTION FORMALLY FOR 
THE RECORD TO REQUEST A JURY INSTRUCTION ON THAT AND OPPOSE 
NOT GIVING THAT INSTRUCTION. I THINK THAT ONE IS IF THE JURY 
FINDS THAT HE DROVE THE CAR AND HAD NOT BEEN INVOLVED AND DID 
NOT INTEND OR WAS INVOLVED IN THE SHOOTING, THEY COULD 
POSSIBLY STILL FIND CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON AND THAT WOULD 
BE SOMETHING I THINK THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO GIVE THE 
JURY THAT ALTERNATIVE HERE BECAUSE ALL YOU HAVE TO DO -- THEY 
ARE SAYING THAT THE STATE HAS TO PROVE, AND THERE'S A JUDGE'S 
INSTRUCTION THAT HE WAS A PARTY TO THE SHOOTING AND FOR THE 
CRIMINAL OFFENSE AND THEREFORE IT GOES FROM A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. IF YOU JUST REMOVE 
THAT I THINK IT'S IN A LESSER INCLUDED AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
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THE COURT: I'LL FIND THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT 
RATIONALLY SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF THAT CHARGE AND WILL DENY 
THAT FOR THAT REASON. NEXT EXCEPTION. 
MR. GAITHER: NO FURTHER EXCEPTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THE COURT'S 
FAILURE TO GIVE ANY PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS? FIRST OF ALL, YOU, 
MR. DIREDA. YOU'VE ALREADY TAKEN EXCEPTION TO THE COURT'S NOT 
GIVING YOUR PROPOSED INSTRUCTION. I'LL NOTE THOSE. AND MR. 
GAITHER, THERE WOULD ALSO BE EXCEPTIONS TO THE COURT'S NOT 
GIVING YOUR PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LESSER INCLUDED. 
MR. GAITHER: I DID NOTICE ANOTHER POINT. NUMBER 31. 
THE DEFENDANT IS A COMPETENT WITNESS. HOWEVER, IN WEIGHING 
HIS TESTIMONY, THE COURT MIGHT PUT THAT HE WAS GOING TO 
TESTIFY. 
THE COURT: I'LL KEEP BOTH OF THOSE IN AND PULL ONE 
OUT. I JUST NEGLECTED TO DO THAT. 
MR. GAITHER: WE WOULD --
THE COURT: PULL 31 OUT. 
MR. GAITHER: THEN I WOULD WITHDRAW THAT EXCEPTION. 
THE COURT: 30 WILL BE THERE. AND WE HAVE POSSIBLE 
VERDICT FORMS. HOW LONG WILL YOU NEED FOR CLOSING, MR. 
DIREDA? 
MR. DIREDA: I WOULD SAY TEN MINUTES WITH MAYBE FIVE 
FOR REBUTTAL. 
THE COURT: HOW ABOUT YOU, MR. GAITHER? 
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